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This paper develops a model of private savings behavior in which households 
care about their descendants, cannot have negative net worth, and have lifetime 
earnings depending on random draws from an exogenous distribution of abilities. 
The elements interact: very lucky parents are likely to leave large estates; 
constrained children are unusually likely to receive intergenerational transfers. The 
paper proves the existence of a stationary cross-sectional distribution of wealth, 
endogenously determines where liquidity constraints will bind, and shows that the 
long-term interest rate must be such that Ricardian neutrality fails. Its last section 
generates several illustrative numerical simulations. Journal of Economic Literature 
Classification Numbers: D90, D91, E21, C68. Cl 1992 Academx PICSS, IILC. 
This paper studies a model of private-sector wealth accumulation. The 
emphasis is long run-the analysis only considers steady-state equilibria. 
The model’s economy has overlapping generations of households. Each 
lives 2. T years. Parents pass their second half of life as the households of 
their adult children live through ages 1 to T. Four key elements in the 
framework are: (1) heterogeneity among households-in the form of 
random differences in earnings abilities; (2) intergenerational altruism; (3 ) 
nonnegativity constraints on households’ intergenerational transfers and 
asset holdings; and (4) technological progress. A priori and in terms of the 
results below, all seem vital; leaving out any one risks not only omitting its 
contribution but, also, overlooking interactions among the complete set. 
This paper presents not only theoretical characterizations but, also, see 
Section 3, several simulations. 
Each household’s labor earnings depend on the wage rate per “effective” 
hour, the economywide state of technology, the household’s age, and 
its individual ability. A variable Z measures the last. Each household’s Z 
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is an independent sampling from a fixed (and exogenous to the model) 
distribution. A household receives its sampling as it begins its existence 
(corresponding to the start of adulthood for its man and wife). The 
sampling is public information and remains fixed for the remainder of the 
household’s life. Earnings’ differences interact with altruism: very “lucky” 
households will want to share with others in their family line through inter- 
generational transfers; moderately lucky households may leave estates to 
“insure” against very low Z’s for their progeny. 
The altruism of this paper is two-sided: families care both about their 
descendants and their predecessors. The degree of altruism is strong: 
families treat their beneficiaries, in a sense described below, as well as 
themselves. This specification may be viewed as one case of interest-or 
perhaps as an upper bound on the intensity of altruism one would want to 
consider. It leads to important gains in tractability in the analysis. 
Nonnegativity constraints take two forms. On the one hand, households 
cannot reach negative net worth. One could think of this borrowing 
constraint as arising from the institution of bankruptcy laws. On the other 
hand, parents cannot extort resources from their children (or children from 
their parents) by choosing to make negative intergenerational transfers-if 
parents (children) are to receive help from their children (parents), the 
latter must willingly provide it. As in Altig and Davis [l], Hall [13], and 
Laitner [23], constraints and altruism operate jointly: the potential 
liquidity problems of children will tend to induce larger intergenerational 
transfers from their parents than otherwise; conversely, such transfers will 
tend to mitigate utility losses from constraints. ’ 
Technological change proceeds at a fixed geometric rate. Since it makes 
future generations generally better off, it will, cet. par., tend to reduce 
transfers from parents to their descendants. 
Two popular existing descriptions of wealth accumulation during 
equilibrium growth are overlapping generations models and models with 
intergenerational altruism. In the first, as in this paper, household’s 
have finite lives. The shapes of lifetime profiles of family composition and 
effective labor supply are important determinants of wealth and factor 
prices. There may or may not be nonnegativity restrictions on family asset 
holdings at each age, although the structure of the OLG model requires, 
at minimum, one such constraint-at the end of life. Fiscal policy is 
potentially important: the timing of lump-sum taxes vis-a-vis the life cycle, 
government debt, and social security can affect the economy’s steady-state 
interest rate. 
A potential difficulty with the OLG framework is that it seems to have 
trouble generating equilibria with realistic ratios of wealth-to-output-see, 
’ Laitner [23] covers this last topic in mm detail. 
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for example, Auerbach and Kotlikoff [2, Chap. 1 l] and Mariger [26, 
Chap. 111. Kotlikoff and Summers’ [ 181 empirical findings seem to point 
to the same phenomenon. While the model of this paper has a number of 
implications in common with conventional OLG formulations, it has no 
difficulty explaining large amounts of wealth (see Proposition 3 below). 
A second approach studies utility maximization over very long or infinite 
time horizons. One view is that such a formulation approximates, if the 
subjective discount rate is near zero, a finite life span problem with random 
shocks occurring extremely frequently (see, for example, Bewley [6]); a 
second view depicts altruistic families who are concerned about their 
descendants (see, for example, Barro [ 31). This paper’s framework clearly 
has the latter interpretation: families care about their dynasty’s well-being 
as well as about events in their own lifetime. 
Within the second approach, one strand of existing literature examines 
“permanent income” models with random earnings’ changes through time. 
In terms of contrast, in the present work private behavior compels a 
steady-state interest rate below households’ subjective discount rate- 
whereas Yaari [38], Schechtman [31], and Bewley [6] study behavior at 
that level. Unlike Yaari [38], this paper incorporates year-by-year non- 
negativity constraints on each household’s net worth. As in the present 
paper, Yaari, Schechtman, and Bewley assume that adverse selection and 
moral hazard preclude insurance against earnings’ unevenness and that 
randomness is idiosyncratic across dynasties (so that the overall rate of 
interest is nonstochastic). 
A second strand of the existing literature on long horizon problems 
studies representative agent models. Interpreting the Brock and Mirman 
[7] model, for example, in this manner, Inada conditions on total produc- 
tion will tend to ensure that liquidity constraints on the representative 
agent never bind. Ricardian debt neutrality follows. In this paper’s analysis, 
on the other hand, some families in each cross section end up being 
constrained. In fact, this paper’s model generates a distribution across 
dynasties of times until liquidity constraints next bind. Also, in contrast to 
Brock and Mirman, the model’s underlying OLG structure makes each 
dynasty’s earnings and savings behavior dependent on where it is in its life 
cycle. 
Laitner [20,21] and Loury [25] examine intergenerational models with 
heterogeneity. Laitner [ZO, 21-J both assume a lower degree of altruism 
than the present paper; perhaps more importantly, neither allows lifetime 
liquidity constraints and lives of more than two periods. In common with 
this paper, Loury generates a distribution of wealth from ability differences; 
in contrast, his concern centers on human capital and there are no 
economywide factor markets. 
This paper’s organization is as follows. Section 1 sets up an overlapping 
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generations framework with altruism. It then introduces earnings hetero- 
geneity and provides existence theorems and characterizations. Section 2 
contributes several additional theoretical results. Section 3 presents 
preliminary numerical simulations, and Section 4 concludes the paper. 
1. THE FRAMEWORK 
This section presents this paper’s basic framework. Private-sector wealth 
accumulation is the focus of attention. Overall, the economy has an 
aggregate production function in which capital and “effective” labor yield 
a single output. The latter is homogeneously divisible into investment and 
consumption. Its current price is always 1. Time is discrete. This paper 
considers only steady states. The features defining such an equilibrium are: 
(i) the net-of-tax interest rate r and the net-of-tax wage per “effective” labor 
unit w  are independent of time; (ii) the aggregate “effective” labor supply, 
E, at time t, grows geometrically at the rate of labor-augmenting 
technological progress y, as does the aggregate wealth stock, K,; and, (iii) 
each agent arranges its consumption and saving to maximize private utility. 
Assets carried by a family from time t to t + 1 finance a portion of the 
aggregate wealth stock at the latter date. The economy is closed and there 
is no money or government debt; hence, K, + i equals the physical capital 
stock used in production at time t + 1. 
The first two subsections below present this paper’s assumptions about 
preferences. The next formulates a dynasty’s utility-maximization problem. 
The one after presents mathematical results. The final subsection interprets 
the results. This paper’s appendix supplies proofs for all propositions. 
Utility from Lifetime Consumption 
There are an equal and large number of families of every age 
s E { 1, . ..) 2. T}. An individual household begins with an adult male and 
female. Over their first T years they raise two children. The children then 
leave home to form new households. The parent household lives an addi- 
tional T years, dying just before its children’s children become adults and 
form new families. The overall population is constant. All families have the 
same preference ordering. Each inelastically supplies natural labor units 
according to a given formula dependent on its age and ability. Labor 
augmenting technological progress at rate y >O converts natural labor 
units into “effective units.” 
This paper omits the complexities of marital ties among families (see 
Bernheim and Bagwell [S]). In other words, think of an economy 
composed of forever separate family lines. For example, among lirst- 
generation descendant families, suppose parents only care about the one 
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including their eldest female child; among second-generation descendant 
families, again only the one with their eldest female descendant; etc. Laitner 
[22] shows that such results have a second interpretation incorporating 
connections through marriage-with choice of marital partner being an 
endogenous part of the model. (In this alternative interpretation, all 
children receive symmetric treatment.) 
Figure 1 shows a time schematic for one family line. At date t + 1 the 
line’s inheriting generation-i household is age T+ 1 and its inheriting 
descendant is age 1. At time t + T, generation i finishes its life and genera- 
tion i + 1 attains middle age. One period later (the line’s) generation i + 2 
starts. 
The subjective discount rate (for all families) is 6 20. Define 
d = (1 + S)-T. Consider the household of generation i in Fig. 1. Let ci(s) be 
its lifetime consumption at each age s = 1, . . . . 2. T; let u(ci(s), s) be the 
corresponding flow of utility; let 
tf = (ci(l), . . . . ci(T)), {; = (cJT+ l), . . . . c;(2. T)); 
and let the household’s utility from its own lifetime consumption be 
For the existence of a steady state with technological progress, the 
analysis below requires homothetic preferences-in other words, isoelastic 
utility (see Katzner [ 16, Theorem 2.4-41): for some function of age h(s), 
u(c, s) = h(s) .A. cfl, 
P 
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FIG. 1. Overlapping generations for one family line. 
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For expositional simplicity, omit the separate logarithmic case below. Let 
n(s) be the number of “equivalent” adults in a household at age s-Tobin 
[34], for example, uses this concept. Given n(s), replace h(s) in (2) with 
h(s) ZE n(s)‘-! 
Intergenerational Altruism 
Continuing with generation-i from Fig. 1, let its family line’s consump- 
tion be (it, ti), 
is-t..., L, r]_l, t:-1, t;,, Si-(tf, <!+I, t f+,t.. .).  
Then assume the total utility of the generation-i household is 
wi(iS, 5i)= f  di’ Cu2(tf)+ u’(t!+,)l. (3) 
i= -m 
A consumption path is feasible if it satisfies all budget and liquidity 
constraints below. Note that at time t + 1 consumption ;g is already past. 
This paper assumes that at that moment the family of generation i wants 
a feasible ki with 
wi(iS7 Gil- wi(iS, 5,*)a” all feasible 57, (4) 
and, at the same time, generation i+ 1 in the line wants a feasible ki with 
wi+l(i5,5i)-wi+l(i5,5*)~o 
all feasible 57. (5) 
Note that Wi( .) and Wi+ 1( .) differ only by a constant of proportionality. 
In light of (3)-(5), generations i and i + 1 both will want to maximize 
f A’* [U’(<f) + u’(tf+ ,)I. (6) 
j=r 
Expressions (3k(5) embody the intense two-sided altruism outlined in 
the introduction: an old family cares about the consumption of its 
daughter’s household exactly as if it were its own; the daughter cares about 
the consumption of her parents exactly as if it were her own. This is 
opposite to a simple life-cycle model without altruism: in such a model, as 
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a child reaches maturity she and her parents cease to value one anothers 
consumption at all. The persistence of affection embodied in (3k(6) seems 
like an interesting special case, and it leads to important simplifications of 
this paper’s analysis: time consistency issues do not arise because of the 
geometric discounting; the implied commonality of interests between 
households within each family line allows us to assume that for the T 
periods during which generations i and i + 1 overlap, they pool their 
resources and solve the joint maximization problem below.2,3 
Behavior 
First consider the deterministic case in which all families have the same 
innate earning ability. A household of age s has n(s) equivalent-adult 
members and supplies I(s) natural units of labor. Let N(s) = n(s) + n(s + 7’) 
and L(s) = 1(s) + Z(s + T), s = 1, . . . . T. Consider a T-period phase of a 
dynasty’s decision problem, a phase immediately after the death of one 
member household and the formation of another. Let the phase start at 
time t + 1 in Fig. 1. As indicated, think of parents and their adult 
daughter’s household as pooling their resources and jointly acting to 
maximize (6). 
Suppose, for the moment, that the dynasty takes as given its initial 
wealth A and the wealth B it must leave at the end of T periods. Then it 
will choose consumption per adult, C(s), and asset holdings, a(s), to solve 




a(s+ l)=(l +r).a(s)+w.(l +~)l+~.L(s)-N(s).C(s), all s, 
a(s) B 0, C(s) 2 0, all s, 
a(l)=A, a(T+l)=B. 
The feasible set for (7) is nonempty if and only if B< (1 + T)~. 
[A+w.(l+y)‘-Y(r)], where Y(r)=~~ZI(l+~)S.(l+~)l-s~L(~). The 
objective is strictly concave and the feasible set is compact and convex, 
2 Laitner [23] provides a more detailed discussion of such preferences and joint maximiza- 
tion. Clearly the precise treatment of deceased ancestors in (3~(5) is irrelevant to current 
behavior. 
3 Note that Hori and Kanaya [lS] would classify (3) as a special case of paternalistic 
preferences. Similarly, (3) corresponds to Kimball’s [ 173 direct utility function (2), and we do 
not employ his functional restriction (1). Laitner [21] and Lindbeck and Weibull [24], for 
example, examine complications arising from strategic behavior when different parties within 
the same line of descent favor themselves over others. 
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so a solution exists and it is unique. Let F(;(A, B; w (1 + y)‘, r) denote the 
maximized value of the objective function. Standard properties of F( .) can 
be established-continuity, monotonicity, and concavity. It can also be 
shown that the optimal policy functions describing the maximizing values 
for consumption and asset holding for all ages s = 1, . . . . T are single-valued 
and continuous. In addition, F( .) is homogeneous of degree b jointly in its 
first three arguments, and the optimal policy functions are homogeneous of 
degree one. 
The dynasty’s intergenerational decision problem is then 




O~B~+~<(l+r)~.[B~+w.(l+y)‘+(j-~)-~.Y(r)], all j > i, 
given Bi 2 0. Behavior according to (8) will maximize (6) for generations i 
and i+ 1. Without loss of generality, set w  = 1. Since F( .) is homogeneous 
of degree p and the wage is growing at the rate y, it is convenient to define 
Let p(r) E [(l + r)/(l + y)]‘. Note that u( .) is well defined if and only if 
A’ <p(r). [A + Y(r)]. 
Without loss of generality, set t = 0 and i = 0 in Fig. 1. Letting 
Aj= B,/(l +y)“=, r- (1 +y)P-r , 
and again making use of homotheticity, we can write the dynasty’s inter- 
generational maximization problem as 
subject to: 
max f rj A’ . v( Aj, A,i+, ; r), 
,=O 
OGAj+1<p(r)‘[Aj+ Y(r)l, all j 3 i, 
(9) 
given A, 2 0. The corresponding dynamic program is 
V(A;r)=max{v(A,A’;r)+r.A.V(A’;r)} 
subject to: 
O,<A’dp(r).[A+ Y(r)], all A 20. 
(10) 
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Given the parameter constraint 
T.d<l, (11) 
Laitner [23] analyzes (9)-( 10). 
The present paper turns to the stochastic case. Let I*(s, Z) denote the 
labor supply at age s of a household with ability Z. A family’s Z is now a 
sampling from random variable 2. The latter has (exogenously given) 
density p(Z), p( .) is continuous and positive for ZE 3 = [0, 11, and 0 
elsewhere. A family’s sampling Z becomes evident at its inception. Assume 
1*( .) is nonnegative and continuous in Z. It will be convenient to 
distinguish between I*(s, Z) and the same household’s “schedule of hours 
receiving compensation” I(s, Z). The latter corresponds to 1 *(s, Z) for ages 
prior to retirement, but it includes claims to social security benefits 
subsequently. This paper assumes 4 
w, -3 
co>i,2- az 2il>O, I(& Z) > 0 all SE(~)..., 2.T}, ZEN. 
Earnings abilities are not heritable. 
Letting L(s, Z, Z’) = I(s, Z’) + I(s + T, Z), problem (7) is unchanged 
except that L(. ), Y( .), and F( . ) have the ability parameters Z and Z’ as 
additional arguments. As before, F( .) is homogeneous of degree /I jointly 
in (A, B; w), and optimal policy functions are homogeneous of degree one. 
The dynasty’s intergenerational problem is analogous to (8), with 
expected utility as the objective. As before, it is useful to renormalize and 
to set w  = 1, so we can write the dynasty’s problem as 
max E 
[ 
f TJ.Aj.v(Aj, Ai+,, Z,, Z,,,; r) (12) 
j=O 1 
subject to: 
O~Aj+,~p(r).CAj+Y(Zi,Zj+,;r)l, all j> 0, 
given (Z,, Z,, A,), where the expectation is over the realization of the Zj, 
j > 1. The corresponding dynamic program is 




4 These properties simplify the proofs in the appendix-see Lemma 5, for example. They 
could follow in practice if, for example, there is a social security system in which benefits relate 
to a household’s past earnings ability. 
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subject to: 
0 <A’ < p(r). [A + Y(Z, Z’; r)], all A > 0. 
The next subsection first shows that (11) essentially ensures that (12) has 
a finite solution. Then, given (ll), and a restriction on r-which turns out 
to hold in equilibrium-we show that it is legitimate to study (13) in place 
of (12). Third, we establish properties of V( .) and the corresponding policy 
functions. Fourth, we use the policy functions to associate, for each r, a 
joint distribution for (A, Z, Z’) with the density of 2. Finally, we derive 
properties useful for establishing the existence and character of a steady- 
state equilibrium. 
Mathematical Results 
Define r* from 
1 +r* 
I+b=(l+Y)‘-p. (14) 
Laitner [23] shows (with first-order conditions) that r > r* leads to wealth 
accumulation too rapid to sustain a steady-state equilibrium. In the present 
paper, the convexity of marginal utility and randomness of future earnings 
lead to still higher saving (for precautionary reasonstsee Proposition 3 
and its interpretation below-so that r > r* continues to be uninteresting. 
Turning to parameter restriction (1 l), suppose B < 0. Then (11) follows 
under our assumptions y > 0 and 6 2 0. With (1 l), (12) is bounded above 
by zero and below by 
f [d.r]‘.u(O,O,O,O;r)> -co, 
j=O 
regardless of r. Suppose B>O. Then (12) is bounded below by zero. It is 
unbounded above if (11) fails; consider merely consuming earnings in every 
generation. Let (11) hold. The following is an upper bound for (12): 
VU(A; r)= f [A .T]j.u(B,(A; r), 0, 1, 1; r), 
i=O 
B,(A; r) = [p(r)]j.A + i [p(r)]“. Y(1, 1; r). 
k=O 
In turn, VU( .) is finite if 
= [ 1 (l+r)B Tel>(l+r)B 1+6 l+S . 
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If r* > r > y, 
l+r (1 +r)B 
-<(l +y)‘-k---G - 
1+6 1+6 [ 1 l+y I-“,1 l+r ’ 
Thus, when /I > 0, (11) is necessary for boundedness in (12), and it is 
sufficient provided r d r*. 
Proceeding with (1 l), 
PROPOSITION 1. Assume (11). Fix w  = 1 and r E [0, r*). Then (i) problem 
(13) has a unique finite soZution V( .), and V( .) also gives the maximized 
value of ( 12). (ii) The maximization in (13) uniquely defines a policy 
function, 
A’ = Y(A, Z, Z’; r), 
and Y( .) is single-valued, nondecreasing in (A, Z), and continuous in 
(A, Z, Z’; r). (iii) There exists a finite upper bound A “(r) such that 
A > A “(r) implies A > Y(A, Z, Z’; r) all Z, Z’ E 3. 5 
The policy function Y( .) determines a distribution of wealth among 
dynasties as follows. In Fig. 1, note that at the close of period t two 
variables characterize the family line’s state: Ai and Zi. The former registers 
the line’s assets carried from t to t + 1 (recall that Ai. (1 + y)’ equals 
life-cycle saving for generation i plus the bequest to generation i from 
generation i- 1); Zi gives the earning ability of the household continuing 
in life. Proposition 1 shows that steady-state equilibrium values of A never 
wander above A”(r). Define the set 
Y(r) = [0, A “(r)] x 2”. 
The policy function Y( .) and the density p( .) define a transition rule on 
9’(r): letting p( -) be the Lebesgue measure, for any Lebesgue measurable 
!E E Y(r), and any x E Y(r), 
@(x, X; r) = j P(Z’) p(dZ’). 
{Z’:(Y(.~,Z’;r),Z’)tY} (15) 
5 Note that ‘P( .) may be decreasing in Z’: higher earnings for a child may lead his parents 
to leave a smaller estate. See, however, Lemma 5 in the Appendix. 
642/S/2-3 
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In other words, if the family line of Fig. 1 has state (Ai, Zi) at the close 
of period t, then the probability that it will close period t + T with 
(Ai+19 Zi+ 1) E % is @((Ai, Z,), X; r). 
Use the notation 
@O( . ) = @(. ), 
~“+‘(x,Z.;r)=S~“(x’,~;r).~(x,dx’;r), n=o, 1, . . . . 
Then 
PROPOSITION 2. Assume (11). Fix w = 1 and r E [0, r*). Then (i) 
@(x, 6%“; r) is a uniquely defined probability transition rule for x > (0,O) and 
Lebesgue measurable sets X. (ii) @( .) has a unique invariant measure #( .) 
on Y(r); states outside of 9’(r) are infeasible or transitory. And, (iii) @“( .) 
is well defined for each n 30 and lim,,, @“(x, %; r) = d(.%; r) for all 
x E Y(r) (with the rate of convergence being untform in x and !E). 
If r E [0, r*), the private-sector’s steady-state supply of wealth is now 
determined. To see this, consider an economy in a steady state. Dynasties 
are divided into T groups of equal size, according to the timing of their life 
cycles. Within each of these T groups there is a continuum of dynasties, 
differing in terms of wealth and earning abilities. Within each of these 
groups, the joint distribution of these variables is given by the invariant 
measure c$( .) of Proposition 2 (note that given the independence of Zi+ i, 
d( .) and p( .) determine the distribution of tuples (Ai, Zi, Z,+l)). The 
distribution, (7), and the law of large numbers determine average wealth 
per dynasty: reintroducing a wage w, and called the maximizing a(s) in our 
normalized version of (7), for a unit born at time 0, a(s, A, A’, Z, Z’; r) for 
s=l , .**, T, average assets per family carried from date 0 to 1 equal 
. p(Z’) u(dZ’) $(dA x dZ; r). (16) 
It will be convenient to have the supply relation in a simpler form. The 
average effective labor supply per family at time 1 is 
S=l 2.T ’ 
In a steady state, technological progress causes this and (16) to grow 
proportionately over time. So, 
Y(r) E 
expression( 16) 
(17) e, .w 
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independent of both t and w. It gives the steady-state supply of wealth 
normalized by the wage bill. We have 
PROPOSITION 3. Assume (11). Fix w and r E [0, r*). Let Y( .) be us 
in (17). Then (i) Y( .) is continuous and finite all r E [0, r*), and 
lim, _ r. Y(r) = co. Using the notation of Fig. 1, let generation i have state 
(Ai, Zi). Let P(A;, Zi, z; r) be the probability that for at least one date 
between t and t+ z, in the line either a lifetime or intergenerational asset 
non-negutioity constraint binds. Then (ii) lim, j Ic P(A,, Z;, T; r) = 1 any 
(A;, Zi) E y(r). 
Steady-State Equilibrium 
Figure 2 identifies steady-state equilibria for this paper’s model. For each 
rE [0, r*), the preceding section derives the unique K,/[w .E,] = Y(r) 
which is both time invariant and consistent with utility maximization on 
the part of all households. Figure 2 graphs the ratio as its “supply curve” 
S. 
An aggregate production function and competitive factor pricing lead to 
a second relationship between r and overall factor intensities. For example, 
a Cobb-Douglas function, competitive pricing, and equal proportional tax 
rates on wages and interest imply 
K, CY 1 -=-.- 
w,.E, 1-cr r,’ 
(18) 
In Fig. 2, D is the locus of points satisfying such an equation. The inter- 
section of D and S determines a steady-state equilibrium. 
K/w*E 
FIG. 2. The steady-state supply (S) and demand (D) for wealth. 
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Proposition 3 shows that Y(r) is finite each r E [0, r*), continuous in r, 
and asymptotically infinite as r 7 r*. Thus, given (18) at least one inter- 
section exists. 
Interpretations 
Laitner [23] describes a model similar to the one here but lacking 
heterogeneous earnings abilities. The S curve then resembles S’ in Fig. 2: 
For r > r* saving is so attractive that steady-state wealth is unlimited. For 
r = r*, family lines want to equalize their consumption per equivalent 
adult, normalized for technological progress, across generations; hence, 
dynastic wealth is husbanded-only interest income on inherited wealth in 
excess of rate y is consumed during the lifetime of any generation. Any 
aggregate amount of wealth sufficient to ensure that lifetime liquidity 
constraints never bind (within any family line) is therefore sustainable, 
giving the flat part of S’. Ricardian neutrality prevails for equilibria at 
r = r*; the distribution of wealth across family lines depends on initial 
conditions; and, a change in earnings or family composition profiles would 
shift S’ horizontally-leaving the intersection of D and S’ unchanged. 
For a steady state with r < r* in Laitner [23], nonnegativity constraints 
on lifetime assets and/or bequests bind methodically every T years in every 
family line. Ricardian neutrality is absent. As a practical matter, 
simulations with interest rates in this range generate supply curves, and 
corresponding equilibria, far to the left, leaving most of the observable 
stock of wealth unexplained. 
As stated, the present paper’s random samplings from 2 and isoelastic 
utility functions imply additional saving-for precautionary reasons. Hence 
even r = r* cannot be a steady-state equilibrium. That is one key implica- 
tion of our analysis. 
The reason r < r* is so important is as follows. When r < r*, first-order 
conditions show that one generation in a dynasty will not desire consump- 
tion for its descendants equal or higher than its own. A generation enjoying 
a very high 2 may want to share its good luck through a bequest, but the 
first-order conditions show that its generosity will be limited. That leads to 
part (iii) of Proposition 1. 
Almost the same logic generates the uniqueness of the stationary 
distribution in Proposition 2: a household with very bad luck must realize 
that its descendants cannot do worse, and, given r < r*, it has no wish to 
sacrifice in order to make their consumption as high or higher than its 
own. Since long strings of very low samplings from 2 are inevitable for any 
family line over enough time, every dynasty eventually experiences a 
minimal A. Therefore the minimal state is in every ergodic set for @( .), 
implying there is only one. 
The inevitable appearance of the minimal state plus the assumed proper- 
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ties of the density for 2 also establish the so-called hypothesis of Doeblin 
(see Stokey and Lucas [32, pp. 345-3481) which leads to the (strong) 
convergence of Proposition 2, part (iii). Similarly, part (ii) of Proposition 3 
follows: a string of very low Z’s within a dynasty takes it close to a 
minimal pair (A, Z); since descendants are almost sure to be better off, the 
current generation will, near the minimal pair, want to borrow against the 
dynasty’s future earnings-implying binding liquidity constraints. None of 
the model’s steady states will then exhibit Ricardian neutrality. (Laitner 
[20] and Feldstein [ 121 report related findings). 
A second key implication of the analysis also follows from the fact that 
precautionary saving makes Y(r*) unbounded: Y(r) + cc as Y t r* is then 
a continuity result. Without random earnings, it would not be-since Y(r*) 
could take finite values. 
The divergence of Y(r) at Y* means that this paper’s model can generate 
steady-state wealth levels matching empirical observation without resorting 
to exceptional interest rates-so that an important liability of conventional 
overlapping generations formulations seems to have been eliminated. The 
divergence also implies that we can reach high wealth ratios in Fig. 2 
without Y(r) becoming perfectly interest elastic-as it does in the simplest 
representative agent formulations. 
For the nonstochastic model of Laitner [23], in a steady state, either 
liquidity constraints never bind (and Y = r*) or they bind every T years in 
every dynasty (and r < r*). In the present paper, the two halves of Proposi- 
tion 3 taken together imply that life-cycle and dynastic considerations must 
both come into play for equilibria near r*: on the one hand, because life- 
cycle wealth will be uniformly bounded for all r < r*, dynastic wealth 
accumulation must assume a role-in fact, eventually a preponderant 
role-as Y( .) diverges; on the other hand, the last part of Proposition 3 
requires binding liquidity constraints within part of each cross section-so 
that some family units must have a time horizon of T years or less. In 
practice, some dynasties will have high recent samplings from 2, and 
their current households will leave estates. Others will currently enjoy 
moderately good luck and will bequeath modest amounts to ensure their 
descendants against very low future Z’s. Households in dynasties enduring 
bad luck will be liquidity constrained. Proposition 5 below views this last 
group again, in a slightly different way. 
2. LIFETIME LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINTS 
One would speculate that the existence of lifetime liquidity constraints 
tends to enhance intergenerational-transfer activity. This section verifies 
that conjecture. It then turns to the question of who will be constrained. 
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Proposition 5 suggests that binding constraints will tend to fall most 
frequently on low-resource families. 
For the moment, drop the lifetime liquidity constraint a(s) 20 of (7). 
Then Proposition 1 generates a policy function for the new formulation, 
say, ‘Y*(A, 2, 2’; r). The proof of Proposition 3 shows 
Y(A, 2, Z’; r) > Y*(A, Z, Z’; r) all r<r*. (19) 
The intuition is as follows: Binding lifetime liquidity constraints tend to 
make consumption early in life lower and later in life higher for given total 
resources; a low marginal utility of consumption late in life and a high 
marginal utility early both encourage large bequests. 
Line (19) shows that the upper bound A O(r) in Proposition 1 remains in 
force in the absence of lifetime constraints. The formulation without 
lifetime constraints generates a stochastic transition function, say, 
@*(x, . ; r): Y(r) + [0, 11, corresponding to @( .). Simplified versions of 
Propositions 2-3 yield a unique invariant measure d*( .), 
I @*(IX’, X; r) 4*(x, dx’; r) 9(r) 
=4*(X; r) all Lebesgue measurable % G Y(r), (20) 
and a function Y*(r) giving the normalized supply of capital for interest 
rates r < r*. 
Proposition 4 shows that lifetime liquidity constraints tend to raise 
overall private-sector wealth accumulation. 
PROPOSITION 4. Assume ( 11). Fix any r E [0, r* ) and set w = 1. Let #( . ) 
be us in Proposition 2, and let Y(.) be as in (17). Let I$*( .) and Y*( .) be as 
above-applying in the formulation without lifetime liquidity constraints. Let 
(A(r), z) = s (A, Z) &dA x dZ; r) and (A*(r), z*) = s (A, Z) d*(dA x dZ; r). 
Then (i) A(r) 2 A*(r) (of course, z=z*) and (ii) Y(r)> Y*(r). 
Part (i) follows from (19) and the last section of Proposition 2. 
Proceeding to (ii), lifetime liquidity constraints make Y(r) higher than 
Y*(r) because higher asset holdings for heirs will tend to follow from the 
higher inheritances of part (i); a “unit” (see (7)) desiring to make a larger 
intergenerational transfer will lower its lifetime consumption-hence its 
assets holdings will tend to be higher; and, by ruling out negative net 
worth, liquidity constraints will tend to raise life-cycle asset holdings. 
Section 4 provides some quantitative results. 
Proposition 3 shows that once we incorporate heterogeneity of earnings, 
periods with binding lifetime and/or intergenerational asset constraints are 
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inevitable over time, in any steady state, for every dynasty. The next 
proposition attempts to indicate where in a cross section of households 
binding constraints are the most likely to appear. 
PROPOSITION 5. Let ( 11) hold, w = 1, and r E [0, r* ). Suppose I(s, 2) = 
Z. l(s, 1) for aEZ Z and s. Let I. > 1. Then (i) Y(l .A, I .Z, A. Z’; r) 2 
1. Y(A, Z, 2’; r). (ii) Comparing f&i/y units with tupies (A, Z, Z’) and 
(A . A, 1. Z, 1. Z’), 1> 1, the latter will be subject to binding constraints for 
the same or fewer periods (out of T) than the former. 
To interpret Proposition 5 consider first a life-cycle model with no 
transfers between families, with identical and homothetic preference 
orderings and with earnings’ profiles which are simple multiples of one 
another across families. Then family consumption and asset profiles will be 
multiples of one another: if one family is constrained, ail will be-and at 
exactly the same ages. Neither the poor nor the rich will be especially 
prone to binding lifetime constraints. Turning to the model of this paper, 
underlying preferences are homothetic. However, even with the linearity of 
I( .) in Proposition 5, dynastic earnings profiles are not simple multiples of 
one another-any two dynasties will have the same joint density for future 
Z’s but their current realizations will randomly differ. Different earnings 
patterns will lead to different sequences of binding constraints. 
We can say more. Intergenerational transfers will be luxury goods: as we 
augment a unit’s lifetime consumption, its corresponding marginal utility 
drops; if we augment its intergenerational transfer, the recipient will tend 
(eventually at least) ‘to share with its descendants, so the decline in 
marginal utility for the recipient will be slower. Hence, a dynasty’s 
optimizing intergenerational transfer will tend to rise more than propor- 
tionately with its current resources. 6 
Given the luxury good nature of intergenerational transfers, Proposi- 
tion 5 emerges: comparing dynasties having current families of the same 
age and current tuples (A, Z, Z’) and (,I . A, A . Z, ;1. Z’), A > 1, in the latter 
current lifetime consumption will tend to be less than i times as high 
because of a more than proportionately larger bequest-thus lifetime 
liquidity constraints will be less of a current issue for the second dynasty. 
Recently empirical work seems to find evidence of binding liquidity 
constraints for 20% or more of U. S. households-see, for example, Hall 
and Mishkin [14], Zeldes [39], and Campbell and Mankiw [S]. While a 
simple life-cycle model might imply the incidence of binding constraints 
would depend exclusively on age, Proposition 5 implies that current and 
past earnings differences will be an additional explanatory factor. 
6 See Laitner [20] and the empirical results in Menchik and David [28]. 
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A final result is even more straightforward: all other factors being equal, 
a unit in (7) receiving a larger intergenerational transfer will be less likely 
to be burdened by lifetime liquidity constraints. Compare two dynasties 
with the timing of Fig. 1. At t + 1, let one have tuple (A ‘, Z, Z’) and the 
other (A, Z, Z’), A’ > A. Current consumption will be less than propor- 
tionately higher for the former-note that Z and Z’ apply to both. 
Furthermore, the former receives a higher proportion of its resources for 
t + 1, .,., t + T at t + 1. Thus, an examination of (7) shows the former 
dynasty will suffer fewer periods of binding liquidity constraints in the near 
future. 
3. SIMULATIONS AND THE TIMING OF INTER Vrvos TRANSFERS 
This section presents several numerical examples. Parameter values are 
chosen from the existing literature. All simulations employ y = 0.0187- 
Denison [ 10, Table 8-41 identifies a growth rate of per capita potential 
national income of 2.25% for the halcyon period 1948-1973, and the 
portion due to labor quality and output per unit of input is 1.87%. 
The simulations use Tobin’s [34] “equivalent adults” scale: minor 
children consume 60% as much as adults, and teenagers 80%. They set 
T= 26: A household begins with a 20-year-old male and a 20-year-old 
female; in its sixth year it has two children; as the parents turn 46, the 
children have left home to form their own families; and, the parents live on 
through age 71. Unlike Tobin, for simplicity this paper assumes a certain 
age of death. (Experiments with uncertain life spans (and annuities) 
showed small differences in Table I for this paper’s model-though some- 
what larger differences in Table II. Trials with Mariger’s [26] estimated 
adult equivalences seemed to cause few additional changes.) 
As in Section 1, in the simulations I(s, Z) has two components. The first 
is labor income and has the form 
ZJ(s).(l-z) 
with s age, Z an (ability) sampling from 2, and z a proportional tax 
rate-set to 0.15, as in Auerbach and Kotlikoff [2]. The profile f( .) comes 
from the median earnings by age figures for 1972 of the Social Security 
Bulletin, Annual Statistical Supplement [36]. Male and female earnings 
were separately multiplied by participation rates from Employment and 
Earnings [37], then by survival probabilities, and then summed. This 
section assumes 2 is truncated log-normal. The variance is Dooley and 
Gottschalk’s [ll, Table l] estimate (from Census data for 1972) of the 
within-cohort variance of the logarithm of earnings for males, 0.451. The 
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support ends at three standard deviations on each side of the mean; 
maximal earnings are about 56 times the minimum. 
The second component, capturing social security benefits, is 
z* . i(s), 
where &,) includes average male social security retirement benefits for 1972 
(see [36]) multiplied by survival probabilities, and the same for females 
(including retired women, wives of retired workers, and widows), and Z* 
is a draw from 2*. The distribution of 2* is the actual 1972 distribution 
of retirement awards-see [36, Table 55]-with the mean normalized to 
one. We assume that 2 and 2* are perfectly correlated- higher earnings 
implying higher stationary-state benefits. So, for a nondecreasing function 
a( .), 2* =Q(2). Then 
l(s, Z) = z. f(s). (1 -r) +52(z). $s). 
Figure 3 graphs this section’s “effective adults” and labor earnings profiles 
n(s) and l(s, l), s= 1, . . . . 72. 
Recent work by Zeldes [39] points to a value for /? near - 1. The tables 
try p = - 1 with 6 = 0 and 0.02. As Auerbach and Kotlikoffs [2, 
pp. S&51] literature survey suggests fi = - 3, this paper’s third trial uses 
p = -3 and 6 = 0. Results are qualitatively similar for all three cases. 
Note that for p = - 1 and 6 =O, I* = 0.0377; for /I = - 1 and 6 = 0.02, 
r* = 0.0585; and, for fl= - 3 and 6 = 0, r* = 0.0769. 
Each simulation determines Y(r) for various values Y E [0, r*). The 
calculations employ a grid over d with 20 intervals, and over A values of 
about 250. The total number of grid rectangles for the space of tuples 
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 
AGE 
FIG. 3. Family earnings and equivalent adult profiles. 
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(A, Z, Z’) is then 250 x 20 x 20. The steps are: use successive approxima- 
tions as in Bellman [4] or Stokey and Lucas [32, p. 2661; generate a 
sequence of indirect utility functions and corresponding intergenerational 
transfer rules Y”( .)-the latter converging to Y(.). (Note that the 
computer need only store a sequence of bivariate functions 
E,~[Wk(A,Z,~')/&4] in this stage.) Proposition 2 takes Y( .) to the 
transition rule @( .). Iteratively form Proposition 2’s invariant measure 
#( .), as in the proposition’s third part. Combining probabilities from d(. ) 
over a grid on Y(r) with independent samplings for Z’ from 2, we have 
a distribution of tuples (A, Z, Z’). Our life-cycle framework from (7) and 
Y( .) associate a lifetime asset profile with each tuple. Using probability 
weights from d( .) and p( .) and averaging over ages, one can deduce 
average family-unit wealth holdings. Dividing by average labor supplied 
times w  yields K/(w . E). The 1972 empirical ratio of the wage bill to GNP 
was 0.6645 (assuming that proprietor’s income followed the same fractional 
breakdown between earnings and return to capital as was true for the 
remainder of national income), and Table I presents results in the form 
K/GNP=0.6645.K/(w.E). 
The second column of Table I presents stationary-equilibrium wealth-to- 
GNP ratios for a life-cycle model (in which life spans are 2. T) with no 
transfers between families or generations and no lifetime liquidity 
constraints. The third column modifies the same model to include lifetime 
constraints. The fourth expands to our framework with intergenerational 
transfers, but omits lifetime liquidity constraints for family units. The fifth 
column refers to the model of this paper. 
Adding Musgrave’s [29] 1972 figure for U. S. net reproducible private 
capital (4655.0 billion 1982~$), the corresponding measure of the stock of 
consumer durables (740.0 billion 1982~$), the 1972 national accounts 
measure of inventories (612.4 billion 1982~$), Seater’s [30] 1972 market 
value of government debt (235.0 billion 1982~$), and the average of the 
1970 and 1974 values of land from [35] (1981.2 billion 1982-$) yields an 
empirical ratio of private wealth to GNP of 3.15. Proposition 3 indicates 
that our model will have no difficulty generating wealth numbers as large 
as this. In fact, column 5 of Table I shows that one can obtain ratios in the 
range of three with parameter values and interest rates having magnitudes 
that are familiar from other studies. 
The graph following Table I displays the asymptotic behavior of 
Proposition 3. It also shows that the S-curve for this example is far from 
perfectly interest elastic in the empirically important range. 
Thurow [33, Fig. l] plots Bureau of Labor Statistics consumption data 
for the early 1960’s. His graph shows consumption varying little with age 
in the cross section. That is consistent with a steady state in which average 
consumption per equivalent adult rises, with household age, at the rate of 
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technological change. Recall that y = 0.0187 here. With r = 0.0225, fl = - 1, 
and 6 = 0 or r = 0.045, /? = - 1, and 6 = 0.02, simulated aggregate average 
consumption per adult rises 1.3 % per year of age; with r = 0.030, j? = - 3, 
and 6 = 0, the average rate of consumption increase is 1.9 %. Hence, the 
model seems in rough agreement with Thurow’s consumption figures. 
Returning to Table I, columns 2-3 show that the simple life-cycle model 
does poorly in explaining the economy’s capital intensity. That is consistent 
with Kotlikoff and Summers [18]. It also follows the pattern of a great 
deal of simulation work-see this paper’s introduction. 
Comparing columns 4 and 5 for wealth ratios near three, we find that 
lifetime liquidity constraints account for one-eighth to one-quarter of the 
steady-state wealth supply. (Trials with adult mortality tended to show 
lifetime constraints accounting for about one-third of all wealth.) 
TABLE I 




Interest liquidity generational 
rate Life cycle constraints life cycle 
Parameters”: p = - 1, 6 = 0 
0.000 -0.767 0.788 0.515 
0.015 -0.194 0.861 1.487 
0.0225 0.083 0.901 2.855 
0.030 0.357 0.953 7.451 
Parameters ‘: /I = - 1, 6 = 0.02 
0.000 - 1.849 0.673 0.067 
0.015 - 1.231 0.740 0.340 
0.030 -0.664 0.810 0.899 
0.045 -0.128 0.889 3.024 
0.0525 0.134 0.939 8.990 
Parameters”: B = - 3, 6 = 0 
0.000 -0.767 0.788 0.663 
0.015 -0.591 0.815 1.156 
0.030 -0.414 0.843 1.917 
0.045 - 0.236 0.871 3.587 
0.060 - 0.058 0.909 8.016 
0.070 0.059 0.934 18.300 
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Table II presents additional details for this paper’s model. For a steady- 
state equilibrium, columns 2-4 give the fractions of family units subject, at 
some time in their lives, to binding lifetime liquidity constraints, binding 
intergenerational transfer constraints on their estates, or at least one of the 
two. For trials with very large wealth ratios, the fractions are small. For 
wealth ratios around three, however, the lifetime constraint numbers are 
about 20%. That would imply that less than 20% of the families within a 
cross section would be experiencing a binding constraint currently- 
whereas the empirical work cited in Section 3 seems to imply that at least 
20% are. 
The hypotheses of Propositions 5 are not satisfied due to our distribution 
of social security payments. Nevertheless, its general implication remains 
valid. For each 2 and Z’ there is a critical A, above which a family unit 
with tuple (A, Z, Z’) is not subject to lifetime liquidity constraints and 
below which it is. Consider the case with r = 0.045, B = - 1, and 6 = 0.02, 
for example. The top realizations of Z and Z’ are 56 times as large as the 
lowest ones, yet, in the simulations, for the highest Z’s the critical A is 
actually more than 50% smaller than for the minimal ones-it certainly 
does not rise in proportion to lifetime earnings. 
Column 5 of Table II considers the breakdown of life-cycle saving and 
bequests. Note that if an average family receives a bequest of b, the average 
amount bequeathed T years later is b. (1 + y)r. We might then think of the 
cohort’s average “dynastic wealth” s years from now as b. (1 + y).‘. 
Similarly, if the average bequest realized now is b, a unit currently age s 
will on average have received b (1 + y ) -.‘, and its current dynastic wealth 
will be b. (1 + y) .‘. (1 + y )” = b. In this light, if we have m “units” of each 
age s = 1, . . . . T, we might think of “dynastic wealth” in the economy as 




r 0.03 - 
0.02 - 
0.01 - 
I I I I I I I I 
0 1 2- 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 IO K/GNP 
FIG. 4. The steady-state supply of wealth from the simulations. 
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about 58 % of all private wealth; with r = 0.045, p = - 1, and 6 = 0.02, the 
share is about 67%; with r = 0.03, j? = -3, and 6 = 0, it is about 57%. 
Kotlikoff and Summers [ 183 favored a somewhat larger numbers-more in 
the range of 80%. 
The last two columns of Table II give average amounts transferred inter 
uivos within family units as fractions of GNP. Table II determines inter 
oivos transfers as follows. A family “unit’‘-see (7)-consists of a parent 
family of age T + 1 to 2. T and a descendant family of age 1 to T. If the 
unit has tuple (A, Z, Z’), it will want to end with assets A’= Y(A, Z, Z’). 
The tuple and A’ enable one to construct the unit’s time path of consump- 
tion. Our equivalent adults’ scale yields separate consumption profiles for 
TABLE II 
Characteristics of Steady-State Equilibria for Intergenerational 
Life-Cycle Model with Lifetime Liquidity Constraints 
Fraction of family units 
subject to binding constraints 
Cross-sectional ratio of 
X-to-GNP for X = 





























0.060 0.03 1 
0.070 0.002 
Parameters”: ~ = - 1, 6 = 0 
0.704 0.772 0.009 
0.439 0.549 0.034 
0.272 0.373 0.078 
0.101 0.151 0.233 
Parameters “: fi = - 1, 6 = 0.02 
0.882 0.895 0.002 
0.785 0.819 0.006 
0.563 0.650 0.021 
0.226 0.315 0.092 
0.059 0.088 0.312 
Parameters”: B = - 3, 6 = 0 
0.566 0.696 0.016 
0.441 0.571 0.028 
0.290 0.396 0.054 
0.135 0.210 0.110 
0.027 0.047 0.272 
















’ Other parameter values as in text. 
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each of the two families in the unit. We assign the entire initial asset stock 
A to the parent family in the unit. (Recall that A consists of the inheritance 
from the parents’ parents plus the life-cycle saving carried by the parents 
from age T to T + 1.) Assigning the descendant family initial assets 0, con- 
sumption and earnings profiles determine asset profiles for the parent and 
descendant families separately. By construction, the sum of assets within 
the unit are nonnegative at each age. The is not true, however, for the asset 
profiles of the parent and child families viewed individually. Whenever the 
descendant family’s assets turn negative, we make, and record, a “lifetime 
transfer” to it from the parent family just sufficient to keep its assets zero. 
The transfer is permanent. Similarly, when the parent family’s assets would 
otherwise become negative, we make and record a “lifetime transfer” from 
the descendant. At the close of age T, residual assets from both parties in 
the unit combine to form A’; the portion from the older family in the unit 
constitutes Table II’s “bequest.” 
With realistic wealth ratios, the table’s lifetime-transfer flows are about 
equal to bequest flows. As a percentage of GNP the former are far larger 
than the survey-based figure of 0.025 reported by Cox [9] and Kurz [ 191. 
The empirical figure may be subject to error-see the remarks in Cox 
[9, p. 5211; nevertheless, our model’s transfers between families seem very 
large. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper develops a model which can encompass both life-cycle and 
dynastic savings. The framework is parsimonious in the sense that no 
parameters are needed beyond what the life-cycle portion of the model 
requires. As stated, there is an interpretation of the model that includes 
marital links between family lines. 
Although all family lines have the same preference orderings and draw 
their earnings’ abilities from the same distribution, the stationary 
equilibrium contains, at least for high enough interest rates, families facing 
different time horizons until liquidity constraints next bind in their 
dynasties. The equilibrium determines the cross-sectional frequency 
distribution associated with the horizon categories. 
Several implications of the analysis at this point are: 
(i) Conventional life-cycle models have great difficulty explaining 
practical aggregate wealth-to-GNP ratios (especially in the presence of 
technological change, children, and social security), but Proposition 3 
shows that this paper’s model can easily support high ratios. Section 3’s 
numerical examples confirm this. 
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(ii) This paper’s framework yields wealth supply curves which are 
not perfectly interest elastic. (In life-cycle models, the same is true; in the 
simplest representative agent models it is not.) Although Proposition 3 
shows that the supply is asymptotically flat, Section 3’s simulations do not 
seem to support perfect elasticity as a good approximation for applications. 
(iii) The analysis provides a reason for expecting a higher frequency 
of binding lifetime liquidity constraints among low-resource families. 
Section 3’s simulations point to a significant fraction of families being 
subject to binding liquidity constraints-hence, in effect, to short planning 
horizons. 
(iv) Lifetime constraints, life-cycle saving, and altruism interact. 
Proposition 4 shows that including lifetime liquidity constraints in our 
model will, cet. par., increase average intergenerational transfers and wealth 
accumulation. Section 3’s examples bear this out. 
While Section 3’s simulations are consistent with empirical observations 
in several very important respects, problems at this point include the large 
volume of inter Coos transfer activity and the relatively low incidence of 
binding lifetime liquidity constraints. More sophisticated treatment of 
lifetime earnings and family composition profiles might help. Another 
possibility would be to incorporate a positive degree of heritability of 
earnings abilities. A more elaborate step would be to reduce the intensity 
of altruism. 
Empirical work and qualitative and, increasingly, quantitative policy 
analyses have made extensive use of life-cycle and representative agent 
models separately. This paper attempts to show that, at least for steady- 
state equilibria, a framework incorporating elements from both models, 
plus lifetime liquidity constraints and earnings heterogeneity, is a feasible 
alternative. Although preliminary simulations do not agree precisely with 
empirical observations in every dimension, several important drawbacks, 
and severe implications, of simpler specifications disappear in the expanded 
framework. 
APPENDIX 
This appendix proves Propositions 1-5. In all cases, “increasing” should 
be distinguished from “strictly increasing,” and “concave” from “strictly 
concave.” p( .) is the Lebesgue measure. 
1. Proof of Proposition 1 
Lemma 1 below proves part (iii). We establish parts (i)-(ii) using the 
general line of reasoning of Lucas and Stokey [32, Chap. 91. 
Consider the case with /? < 0. Then v( .) d 0. Replacing u( .) in (12) and 
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(13) with max{u(A, A’, Z, Z’; Y), ~(0, O,O, 0; r)}, we have a bounded 
problem. Optimizing behavior will render the preceding change irrelevant 
in terms of V( .) and ul( .). Stokey and Lucas [32, Theorems 9.2, 9.6-9.101 
apply to the modified problems. Thus, (i)-(ii) hold and V(/(A, Z, Z’; r) is 
concave in A. 
Suppose B>O. Then V( .) LO. Let V”( .) be as in the text. Since the text 
shows that VU(A; r) < cc any A, [32, Theorem 9.21 proves that any 
solution to (13) bounded above by V”( .) gives the optimized value for 
(12). Define the operator T as in [32, Theorem 9.61. Let l”(A, Z. Z’; r) = 
v(A, 0, Z, Z’; r) and Vnf ’ = T( V”) all n = 0, 2, . . . Then the sequence of 
functions I’” is monotone nondecreasing and bounded above by Vu. Hence 
it has a limit, say, V*(A, Z, Z’; r) < VU(A; r). Standard procedures-see, 
for example, Laitner [20, Proposition l]-show I’*(. ) solves (13). Since 
the convergence above is uniform, l’*( .) is continuous. As in [32, 
Lemma 9.51, V*( .) is concave and nondecreasing in A; thus, the continuity 
and strict concavity of u( .) imply a unique, single-valued Y( .) exists. 
[ 32, Theorem 3.61 establishes the continuity of Y( ). 
Since V( .) is concave in A, the right-hand side of (13) shows that Y( .) 
is increasing in (A, Z). i 
LEMMA 1. If r E [0, r*), there is A u(r) < cc1 such that A > A u(r) implies 
y(A, Z, Z’; r) < A and A <A u(r) implies !P(A, Z, Z’; r) <A u(r). 
Proof Fix any rE [0, r*). 
Step 1. Suppose at first that lifetime liquidity constraints never bind. 
Let c(r) E [d . r. p(r)]“. Then Laitner [20, Proposition 41 shows that 
Y(A, Z, Z’; r) Q max{O, c(r). [A + Y(Z, Z’; r)]} 
if c(r) < 1, c(r) <p(r). (Al) 
But, 
c(r) < 1 
l+r 9.&.(l+y)~-l+i’-d~r~r*~ 
So, c(r) < 1. The preceding also shows c(r) < p(r) if r > y. In general, 
c(r) <p(r) * 
(l+YY.l+r< l+r r-p __ 
1+6 l+y [ 1 e(l+r)B<l l+Y 1+6 
Thus, r < y and d . r < 1 imply c(r) < p(r) as well. Hence the conditions of 
(Al) are met. 
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Setting A * = c(r) . Y( 1, 1; r)/( 1 - c(r)), 
A<A**Y(A,Z,Z’;r)~Y(A*,Z,Z’;r) 
<c(r).[A*+ Y(l, l;r)]=A*, (A21 
A>A**Y(A,Z,Z’;r)Qc(r).[A-A*+A*+Y(l,l;r)] 
=c(r).[A-A*]+A*<A. (A3) 
Step 2. Create a new version of (7) with I( .) in place of I( .) and 
if s= 1; 
otherwise. 
Let V( .) be the new version of u( .), F( .) the new version of I’(.), and F(. ) 
the new version of Y( .). It is easy to see in (7) that lifetime liquidity 
constraints never bind for V( .). So, replacing A* above with 
A* G c(r). F(l, 1; r)/(l -c(r)), (A2)-(A3) hold. 
Step 3. In (7), if B = 0, there exists A ** < cc such that A 3 A ** implies 
a(s) > 0 does not bind s = 1, . . . . T. The same then follows for A > A ** and 
any feasible BaO. 
The changes of Step 2, provided total lifetime resources in the present 
problem (7) are left unchanged and provided none of the constraints 
a(s) > 0 bind in the present (7), would increase bequests (or leave them 
unchanged). Define 
q(r) = Y(Z, Z’; r) - l( 1, Z). 
Then for A > A**, Y(A, Z, Z’; r) < p(A + q(r), Z, Z’; r). Proposition 1 
shows that Y( .) and 9( .) are increasing in A. Define 
A***=c(r)- v(r) + ytl, 1; r) 
l-c(r) ’ 
Let A”rmax{A*, A**, A***}. Then Step 1 shows 
A<AU+Y(A,Z,Z’;r)<Y(AU,Z,Z’;r) 
< F(A”+ q(r), Z, Z’; r) 
<c(r). [AU+q(r)+ F(l, 1; r)] 
= c(r). [A ’ - A ***]+A***<A”, 
A> Au* Y(A, Z, Z’;r)< p(A+q(r), Z, Z’; r) 
<c(r). [A -A ***]+A***<A. m 
642/58/2-4 
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2. Proof of Proposition 2 
Part (i) follows from Proposition 1 and Stokey and Lucas [32, 
Theorem 8.93; their Theorem 8.5 shows that @“( .) is well defined. 
Parts (ii)-(iii) involve verifying that Condition M of Stokey and Lucas 
holds, so that their Theorem 11.12 applies. Condition M is established by 
showing that there exists E > 0 and integer N such that for any set 9 with 
complement 9:” we have 
QN(x, %; r) > .5 or CDN(x, %-“; r) > .5 all x. 
Lemma 4 below covers a degenerate case; Lemma 6 establishes M for all 
other instances. 
LEMMA 2. Let r E [0, r*). Let II/(A) z !P(A, 0,O). Then II/( .) has a unique 
fixed point A FP on [0, co). We have AFP = $(O) < A o. 
ProoJ Lemma 1 shows that there is no fixed point above Ao and that 
1(/: [0, A “I--+ [0, A “I. We have seen Y( . ), hence $( .), is continuous. Thus 
a fixed point A FP exists in [0, A “1. 
Let C,(A, Z, Z’; r), s= 1, . . . . T, be utility-maximizing age-s consumption 
(per equivalent adult) for the normalized version of (7) (defining u( .)), 
given A’ = !P(A, Z, Z’; r). It is single-valued and continuous. Standard 
arguments show that it is increasing in (A, Z, Z’). First-order conditions 
for a dynasty require 
&(Cl(AFP, 0,O; r), 1) 
2 H(r). E 
[ 
cYu( Cl (A FP, 0,2; r), 1) 
l3C ac 1 9 
where H(r) = p(r)/( 1 + y)’ p8. Note that r < r* implies H(r) < 1. Since 
H(r) < 1 and C,( .) is increasing, the foe above must hold with strict 
inequality. Since A FP = !P( A FP, 0,O; r), that implies nonnegativity 
constraints must bind during the lifetime with (AFP, 0, 0), or at death. 
Binding constraints imply Y( A FP, 0,O; r) = Y( A, 0,O; r) for any A < A FP. 
Hence, AFP = $(O)-making AFP unique. 1 
LEMMA 3. LetrEIO,r*).LetA”EIO,AU]andA”+‘=$(A”)with$(.) 
as above. Then lim, j m A” = AFP. Zf U is any open neighborhood of 
(AFP, 0), there exist integer N and positive p. such that a dynasty starting 
at (A,, Z,) E Y has probability 3 p. of reaching (AN, Z,) E U. 
Proox As above, the first-order condition 
WCl(A”, (40; r), 1) 
2 H(r). E 
&(CI(An+‘, 0,2; r), 1) 
K ac 1 9 
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with H(r) < 1, must hold with strict inequality if A”+ ’ > A”. The preceding 
proof then implies A”+’ = AFP. So, A”+” = AFP all s > 1. Otherwise 
A ‘+’ <A”. Since A” > 0, if that continues, A”1 2. Then A= lim $(A”) = 
$(A), with A= AFP according to the preceding lemma. 
Let U be an open set containing (A FP, 0). Consider a dynasty with 
(A,, Z,)= (AFP, 0). Generate Ai= Y(Ai-,, ZIpI, Z;; r) each i= 1, 2, . . . . 
Note A,>, AFP all i. Because Y( .) is continuous, the preceding paragraph 
shows there is finite N and p,, > 0 such that a sequence Z,, Z,, Z,, . . . of Z’s 
near zero yielding (AN, Z,) E U has probability at least p,,. Since Y( .) is 
increasing in its first two arguments, the same sequence of Z, , Z,, . . . yields 
(AN, Z,) E u any (A,, Zo) E 9. I 
A special case immediately yields a unique ergodic set and stationary 
distribution: 
LEMMA 4. Let r E [0, r*). Suppose !P(AFP, Z, Z’; r) = AFP for all Z, Z’. 
Then {AFP} x d is the unique ergodic set for @( .). All other states are 
transitory. The unique stationary distribution assigns zero probability to sets 
& x 98 with A FP $ d and probability Ja p(Z) u(dZ) otherwise. 
Proof Let Y(A FP, Z, Z’; r) = A FP all Z, Z’ E 6. Then clearly 
{A FP > x 9“ is an ergodic set and the stationary probabilities are as stated. 
Lemma 2 shows that AFP= tj(O) and that if the dynasty of Fig. 1 has 
(A, Z, Z’) = (A FP, 0,O) at t + 1, it faces binding asset nonnegativity 
constraints within T years. First-order conditions and I(s, Z) > 0 imply 
there exists an open neighborhood do of AFP such that Y(A, Z, Z’; r) = 
t&O) all (A, Z, Z’)EJ%” x [0, 41 x 9%“. Then Lemma 3 shows all states 
outside of {AFP} x 2 are transitory. 1 
For cases other than Lemma 4, we need Lemmas 5-6. 
LEMMA 5. Fix any A, Z,, and Z,. Define 
f(Z; r) = Y( Y(A, Z,, Z; r), Z, Zz; r). 
Suppose f (Z; r) > 0, AZ > 0, and Z + AZ < 1. Then there exist positive a 1 
and a*, independent of A, Z,, Z, Z,, AZ, and rE [0, r*) such that 
a,.AZ<f(Z+AZ;r)-f(Z;r)da,.AZ. 
The upper bound applies even iff (Z; r) = 0. 
Proof Think of the dynasty in Fig. 1 with t = 0. Let Y(A, Z,, Z, ; r) be 
its transfer at date r, let f(Z,; r) be its transfer at 2. T. Think of an 
increase AZ in Z,. Then dynastic earnings rise between iI. AZ and 
2 . lz . AZ for times 1, . . . . 2. T. First-order conditions show the transfer at 
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2 f T could rise or remain unchanged, but it could not fall. First-order 
conditions also show that no more than the present value at time 2. T of 
the entire earnings increase could be bequeathed. This and iz imply Q. 
A larger Z = Z ’ increases dynastic earnings by at least [, AZ for each 
time 1, . . . . 2. T. If the transfer at 2. T remained unchanged, first-order 
conditions put a definite lower bound on the increase in normalized 
consumption (see Lemma 2) C,. 7. When f(Z; Y) > 0, 
8@,.,+,,2.T+ 1) 
ac ]- (A4) 
Thus the transfer at 2 . T must rise for AZ> 0. The rise will be smallest if 
lifetime constraints route the entire increase in the transfer to Cz T+, . Even 
in that case, (A4) implies a positive a,. 1 
LEMMA 6. Let r E [0, r*). Suppose Y(AFP, Z, Z’; r) # AFP some 
Z, Z’ E 3. Then @( .) satisfies the conditions of Stokey and Lucas 
[32, Theorem 11.123. 
Proof. Recall ME [p”, p’] c (0, 00) all 2~9’. Fix any rE [0, r*). 
Step 1. We first show 
Y( Y( A FP, 0, Z; r), Z, Z’; r) > 0 for some Z, Z’ E 9%“. (A51 
If AFP > 0, set 2 = Z’ = 0. Then Lemma 2 implies 
Y( Y( A FP, 0, Z; r), Z, Z’; r) = Y( Y(AFP, 0,O; r), 0,O; r) 
= Y(AFP, O,O;r)=AFP>O. 
If A FP = 0, since Y( . ) b 0, this lemma’s statement implies Y(A FP, Z, Z’; r) 
> 0 for some Z, Z’. Then, using the monotonicity established in 
Proposition 1 and Y( .) > 0, 
Y( Y(AFP, 0, Z; r), Z, Z’; r) > Y(0, Z, Z’; r) = Y(AFP, Z, Z’; r) > 0. 
Step 2. We establish Stokey and Lucas’ [32] Condition M. The 
continuity of Y( .) and (A5) imply there exist open intervals &‘*, %‘O, %I, 
and f&* such that A FP E do, 0 E %!*, and 
(A*, z”, z’, 2’) Ed0 x cB* x 42’ x e* - Y( Y(A”, Z”, Z’; r), Z’, Z2; r) >O. 
Define %“‘O = do x %*. Let 
B(x, Z,)= { Y(Y(x, Z,; r), Z,, Z2; r): Z1 E*“}. 
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For x E W” and 2, E 42*, Lemma 5 implies that 
and that B(x, Z,) is an interval. Using the continuity of !P( .), there exist 
nonempty open Woo c W’O, open 4Yz2 c 4Y2, and open 9” such that 
9P1 E qx, Z2) for all x E Woo, Z, E %!22. 
Define 
W,Z,,%;r)= {Z,: (Y(W, Z,;r), Z,,z,;r),z,)~X}. 
For x E Woo and Z 2 E 4Y22, Lemma 5 implies 
for any 2? c 9”. 
So, for x E Woo and X E 9” x 4Y22, 
Lemma 3 implies that from any starting point x E Y, a dynasty has 
probability 2 p. > 0 of reaching Woo after N periods. Thus, for any x E Y 
and Xc%“’ x%22, 
Let E be half the final magnitude in (A6). Consider any set 9 in 9’ and 
its complement d . G-Y At least half the area of X must lie in 9 or 9’. In the 
former case, for example, QN+ 2(x, 9; I-) 3 E all x E Y. i 
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3. Proof of Proposition 3 
Provided r < r*, the stationary distribution of A is bounded-hence so is 
Y(r). Let AFP be as in Lemma 2. The Lemma’s proof shows nonnegativity 
constraints bind between t + 1 and t + T+ 1 for the dynasty of Fig. 1 if it 
begins period t + 1 having (Ai, Zi, Zi+ r ) = (AFP, 0,O). Thus there exist 
open sets d containing AFP and “2 containing 0 such that nonnegativity 
constraints bind on the dynasty between t + 1 and t + T+ 1 if 
(A;, Zi, Zi+ ,) E d x @ x %!. The last part of Lemma 3 then establishes (ii). 
Following Stokey and Lucas [32, p. 2371, note that for 
g: %2-+%2 and g(x, z’; r) = g( Y(x, z’; r), z’) .p(z’), 
we have 
J, g(x’) . @(x, dx’; r) = js 2(x, z’; r) p(dz’). (A7) 
If g( .) is continuous, S(. ) is too. In that case, the Lebesgue dominated 
convergence theorem shows that 
S, g*(x,, z’; r,) AW + IT g*(x, z’; r) P(W. 
Hence @(x,, . ; r,) converges weakly to @(x, . ; r). [32, Theorem 12.131 
then establishes the continuity of Y( .). 
The last task is to show lim,,,, Y(r) = co. This will follow if we can show 
the mean of the stationary distribution of bequests converges to co as r t r*. 
Modify (7) to drop the lifetime nonnegativity constraint on asset 
holdings. The normalized version of (7) then has a closed form solution 
u*( .) with 
h(r) 1 B v*(A, A’, Z, Z’; r) =-. 
B 
A+ Y(Z,Z’;r)-A 1 p(r) ’ 
where uO(r) is a known function. Define I’*“( .) for the new problem as in 
the proof of Proposition 1. Note the convergence of the corresponding 
policy functions yl*n( .)-as in Stokey and Lucas [32, Theorem 9.91. 
Letting Vn( .) and lyn( .) apply with lifetime constraints, it is not difficult to 
see that 
!PY”(A, Z, Z’; r) > Y*“(A, Z, Z’; r) for all n = 1, 2, . . . . (A81 
In fact, we can generate even a lower bound yl**“( .) for each n: having 
written first-order conditions determining yl*“( .), take the expected value 
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operator inside the marginal utility expression-using Jensen’s inequality. 
In solving the first-order conditions, drop the nonnegativity constraint 
A’ 2 0. (This does not imply an unbounded problem; in the n th period, 
consumption must equal current earnings and assets on hand.) We can 
derive a closed-form solution for the limit, say, Y**(. ). Let H(r) < 1 be as 
in Lemma 2. Note: A . r< 1 and the definition of Y* show that p(r) > 1 for 
r near r*. Then if y,(Z;r)~C,T_l(l+y)S~‘.(l+r)‘-S.I(s,Z) and 
Y*(Z;r)~C,T_I(l+y)S-‘.(l+y)l~s.l(S+T,Z), 
Y**(A, z, Z’; r) = h . [A + y,(Z; r) + y,(Z’; r)] 





.JTY,(~; r) + Y@; rYp(r)l. (A9) 
In fact, since Jensen’s inequality is strict, given our assumptions about 2, 
Y(A, Z, Z’; r) 2 Y**(A, Z, Z’; r) + &(A, Z, Z’; r), (AlO) 
where E( .) is strictly positive and continuous. 
Suppose the mean of the stationary distribution of A does not diverge 
as r T r*. Then we can find a sequence rn t r* and a finite bound Amax 
for the corresponding stationary distribution means, say, 6,. Because 
0 < 2, < A-“, at least half of the probability weight for A”,, must fall in 
[0,2. A”“‘]. For a stationary (A”,, 2), 
Using (AlO), 
‘2 n - Y(A,, 2,2’; r,). 
A, = E[ Y(‘(A”,, 2,2’; r,)] 2 E[ Y**(A”,, 2,2’; r,)] + E[c(A”,, 2,2’; r,)]. 
If half the probability weight for 2, each n falls in [0, 2 . Amax], there exists 
t>O with ,!?[&(a,, 22’; r,)] 2r all n. Using (A9), for r=r,,, 
Y**(A, Z, Z’; r,) = H(r,) . A + terms + &(A, Z, Z’; rn), 
where the “terms” converge to 0 as H(r,) -+ 1 (i.e., as r--t r*). Thus, 
00 > A-” 2 lim A, 2 lim 
E[E(A,, 2,2’; r,)] 
n-cc n+m 1 - Wr,) 
2 lim 
z 
r.~r* 1 - H(r,)= Oo7 
a contradiction. So, lim,, ,. Y(r) = co. 1 
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4. Proof of Proposition 4 
Use Stokey and Lucas’ definition of monotonicity for measures. Let 
g: %* + %* be increasing. Define S( .) as in (A7) using Y( .), and g*( .) 
using Y*( .). Then (A7) and (19) imply @(x, . ; r)> @*(x, . ; r). Since 
Y(x, 2’; r) is increasing in x (see Proposition l), (A7) shows that x, > x0 
implies @(x,, . ; r) 2 @(x0, . ; r). Let g( .) be as above. Let @“( .) be the 
iterated transition function constructed from Y( .); let @*“( .) be the same 
for Y*( .). Then Exercise 12.11 of Stokey and Lucas shows that 
ss g(x") @(x', dx") @(x, dx') 
2 ss 
g(x"). @(x', dxU) @*(x, dx') 
2 ss 
g(x"). @*(x' Lid') @*(x, dx'). 
Similarly, induction shows that Qn(x, . ; r) 2 @*n(~, . ; r) for all n = 1, 2, . . . . 
Part (i) then follows from part (iii) of Proposition 2. 
Look at (16). Since Y( . ) is increasing in (A, Z), a(. ) is too-recall 
Mariger’s [27] diagrams. The preceding paragraph shows d(. ; r) 2 b*(. ; r). 
This and (19) then establish part (ii). 1 
5. Proof of Proposition 5 
Using the notation from previous proofs, when I(s, Z) = Z. Z(s, 1) and 
23 1, 
Yk(l.A,2.Z,1.Z’;r)>l.Yk(A,Z,Z’;r) for all k 
(i.e., if all future Z’s were multiplied by il, Yk(A, Z, Z’; r) would be too). 
Part (i) follows since hmk _ o. Yk(A, Z, Z’; r) = Y(A, Z, Z’; r). Part (ii) 
then follows from Mariger’s [27] diagrams. 1 
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